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INTRODUCTION
Although many international trade scholars view the dispute settlement system of the
World Trade Organization (the “WTO”) as a success, the definition of “success” depends on the
perspective and experience of each Member state. Developed (and some developing) countries
such as the United States, the European Union (EU), Brazil, and India utilize the system with
varying degrees of frequency. 1 However, Member states with smaller economies or in differing
stages of development either tend to shy away from participating in disputes or are unable to

1a

Any views expressed herein by interviewees are private and do not necessarily represent the views of their
respective organizations or other members of that organization.
1
The terms EU and EC (European Communities) are used interchangeably throughout this article. Technically it is
the EC that, according to Article XI of the 1994 Agreement Establishing the WTO, is a member of the WTO.

access the system. 2 The reasons for this may include a lack of resources, a lack of institutional
capacity, or a lack of political will. Others have pointed out that overall smaller trade volumes
also contribute to less usage by developing countries since there may be less potential for
dispute.3
To date, only one least-developed country (as designated by the United Nations4) has
initiated a complaint through the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).5 Forty-four countries with
“lower middle income” economies and twenty-four with “low income” economies have initiated
complaints, but of the twenty-four complaints by low income economies, sixteen were on the
part of India.6 With 380 WTO disputes initiated to date, this means that “developing countries,”7

2

See, e.g., Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country
Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 861, 862 (2005) (“The poorest countries in the WTO system
are almost completely disengaged from enforcement of their market access rights through formal dispute settlement
litigation.”). See also GARCIA BERCERO & P. GARZOTTI, DSU Reform: What are the Underlying Issues?, in REFORM
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 123, 145 (Dencho Georgiev & Kim Van der
Borght eds., Cameron May Ltd. 2006). (“[M]ost low income developing countries and certainly the least-developed
countries are notably absent from WTO dispute settlement”).
3
See, e.g., MOHAN KUMAR, Dispute Settlement System in the WTO: Developing Country Participation and Possible
Reform, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 177 (Dencho Georgiev & Kim
Van der Borght eds., Cameron May Ltd. 2006).
4
See WTO.org, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2008). Of the
fifty least-developed countries on the United Nations’ list, thirty-two are WTO members recognized as such. Id.
5
WorldTradeLaw.net, List of all WTO complaints brought pursuant to the DSU (not including Article 21.5
disputes), http://0-www.worldtradelaw.net.gull.georgetown.edu/dsc/database/searchcomplaints.asp (last visited Oct.
25, 2008). In January of 2004 Bangladesh requested consultations with India concerning an Indian anti-dumping
measure on lead acid batteries from Bangladesh. Request for Consultations, India – Anti-Dumping Measure on
Batteries from Bangladesh, WT/DS306/1 (January 28, 2004). India eventually removed the measure in question and
the parties informed the DSB of a mutually satisfactory solution on February 20, 2006. WTO Website,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds306_e.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2008).
6
See WorldTradeLaw.net, WTO Complaints Sorted by Type of Economy, available at http://0www.worldtradelaw.net.gull.georgetown.edu/dsc/database/complaintsclassification.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2008).
The designations of “lower middle income” and “low income” are created by WorldTradeLaw.net. India remains a
developing country, but it has become one of the world’s fastest growing economies, with average growth rates of
8% over the past three years. See The World Bank, India Country Overview 2008,
http://www.worldbank.org.in/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,,contentMD
K:20195738~menuPK:295591~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:295584,00.html (last visited Nov. 17,
2008).
7
The term “developing country”, as used throughout this paper, includes countries with economies in transition and
customs territories.

even as that term is defined in its most elastic form8, have brought less than 18% of the total
complaints under the WTO system. Furthermore, even though developing countries make up the
majority of the WTO membership, the minority membership of developed countries probably
initiates more than 80% of the disputes.
Notwithstanding the impressive participation of some developing countries, such as
Brazil, India, and Mexico, one commentator contends that “the vast majority of developing
countries professed only what is known as ‘systemic interest’” in dispute settlement. 9 Systemic
interest refers to the fact that developing countries rarely have more than an “indirect commercial
interest” in the litigation due to their comparatively smaller trade volumes. This tangential
relationship to disputes often translates into developing country participation only at the
consultation stage or as a third party.10
The paucity of developing country-initiated cases may run counter to the presumed goals
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (the “DSU”) drafters. The WTO negotiators plainly
intended to encourage developing countries to use the system, as demonstrated by “special and
differential treatment” provisions laid out across the various WTO agreements. These provisions
specifically deviate from the general rules, and they provide special rights “which give
developed countries the possibility to treat developing countries more favorably than other WTO
Members.”11 The text of the DSU alone contains at least eleven such provisions by which
developing countries should enjoy, for example, the right to have special attention be paid to the

8

The WTO website provides no definition of either “developed” or “developing” country. Instead, it explains that
members self-determine their development status. WTO.org, Who are the developing countries in the WTO?
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
9
Kumar, supra note 3, at 180.
10
Id.
11
WTO.org,
Work
on
special
and
differential
provisions,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm#legal_provisions
(last
visited Nov. 12, 2008).

particular problems of developing countries. 12 Another provision allows developing countries to
insist that, in cases between them and a developed country, at least one panelist be from a
developing country. 13
Why then, given their greater number and the possibility for preferential treatment, are
developing countries so underrepresented in launching WTO disputes? It is understandable if,
due to smaller trade volumes, certain countries have less monetary incentive to participate. But if
some Members desire to participate and cannot, due to unequal access or other reasons, this is
troublesome. As mentioned above, some attribute the dearth of developing country-initiated
disputes, at least in part, to what Gregory Shaffer has categorized as “constraints of legal
knowledge, financial endowment, and political power, or, more simply . . . law, money, and
politics.”14 One could also characterize this dilemma as simply a problem of mobilizing
resources.
This top-heavy nature of the WTO dispute settlement system is troubling for many
reasons. Most obvious is that if resource constraints or other external forces translate into a lack
of access on the part of some Members, there is a fairness problem. Since the rules of
international trade apply to all WTO Members, the benefits accruing from application and
interpretation of those rules (including access to dispute resolution) should also apply in a

12

WTO.org,
Work
on
special
and
differential
provisions,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm#legal_provisions
(last
visited Nov. 12, 2008). See also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments - Results
of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) art. 4.10 [hereinafter DSU]. Developing countries can also take
advantage of unilateral preference schemes, such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which violate the
principle of Most Favoured Nation but illustrate other forms of favorable treatment.
13
DSU, supra note 12, art. 8.10.
14
Gregory Shaffer, The challenges of WTO law: strategies for developing country adaptation, 5 WORLD TRADE
REVIEW 177, 177 (2006). There are many potential reasons for less use of the dispute settlement system by
developing countries. As mentioned above, comparatively smaller trade volumes may translate into less incentive to
initiate disputes. This paper recognizes that there may be alternative explanations for the question raised, but focuses
on resource problems (and how they translate into fact-finding challenges and lack of access) to analyze the issue of
participation.

uniform manner.15 Probably more vexing, though, are the systemic issues raised by this apparent
unfairness. One of the key characteristics setting the WTO apart from the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (the “GATT”) is the stronger and binding dispute settlement process. If access
to this process is unequal, this raises larger questions of the organization’s overarching
legitimacy and stature in the realm of international law.
To alleviate the inequities of this situation, the constraints of law, money, and politics
must be boiled down and identified for the effects they have in practice. To a large extent, the
complexities of each limitation intertwine with those of the others, and this paper addresses the
problems within this naturally interconnected state. It will attempt to answer the general
question, “what frustrates developing country participation in the WTO dispute settlement
system?” It also aims to identify some possible solutions.
Part I of this paper examines some of the reasons why developing countries use the WTO
dispute settlement system less than the WTO’s more wealthy developed Members. First, it
examines the problem of fact-finding, briefly analyzing the increasing importance of facts in
WTO jurisprudence, and why this is problematic for developing countries. Second, it identifies a
lacuna of both formal and informal legal procedures within developing countries and relates this
to endemic private sector attitudes. Finally, this section examines the problem of political will as
it relates to the non-existence of developing country-initiated disputes.
Part II offers six proposals to address the problems identified in Part I. The proposals are
the creation of a WTO fact-finding body, the formalization of a “discovery” phase at the WTO,
the enhancement of public-private partnerships in WTO litigation, a small claims procedure, the

15

See NIALL MEAGHER, Representing Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, in WTO LAW
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 213, 214 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., Cambridge University
Press 2007) (“[T]he multilateral trading system benefits from the uniform and consistent interpretation of rules that
apply to all.”).
AND

revitalization and expansion of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, and a “continuum” of WTO
Secretariat duties. This section addresses each proposal in kind, analyzing the feasibility of each.
The Conclusion presents the most workable steps that can be immediately taken from each of the
proposals at the lowest cost.

I.

WHY DO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES USE THE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM LESS?

There are a host of reasons why developing countries appear to use the WTO dispute
settlement system less aggressively than, for example, the United States, the EU, or even Brazil.
This paper does not intend to identify every reason, but focuses on three which, although
addressed as stand-alone problems here, should be viewed as part of the interconnected whole of
many issues. 16
First, this section briefly addresses the increasing importance of fact-finding in WTO
disputes. It specifies the particular kind of fact-finding at issue and examines its increasing cost.
Second, this section discusses the importance of a link between private industry and government,
which most developing countries lack. It refers to the U.S. and EU models of both formal and
informal public-private partnerships. Finally, this section highlights the problems of political will
faced by developing country Members of the WTO.

16

As already mentioned, Kumar has pointed out that developing countries may have small trade volumes compared
to other WTO Members, and therefore will have less of a financial incentive to initiate disputes.

a.

1.

The problem of fact-finding

Fact-finding is important

As any experienced WTO practitioner can attest, the nature of litigating in the dispute
settlement process is constantly evolving. From the early days of the GATT structure to the
current WTO framework, the international trade community has witnessed a number of
important changes to the way disputes are resolved.
Over time, WTO disputes have increasingly turned on the factual evidence presented as
opposed to the application of simple a priori tests or principles, a reflection of what might be
called a “legalization” of WTO dispute settlement. This is quite a dramatic shift from the nature
of disputes under the GATT system. As Jackson, Davey and Sykes note, “[i]n GATT dispute
settlement, it was often the case that factual issues were not that important.”17 Through the
application of presumptions or other widely applicable legal principles, a GATT panel’s main
objective was to determine whether a particular Member’s measure violated GATT rules. 18
WTO panels face a more involved task. The issues brought before the DSB are
progressively more complex (as discussed below) and the DSU presents varied procedural
hurdles. As a result, panels today must pay closer attention to the facts presented by the parties.
Consequently, WTO cases, more than GATT cases, can involve drawn-out disputes over
complicated factual issues.19 The result of this evolution is a more factually contextualized

17

JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 272 (5th ed. 2008).
18
Id.
19
Id.

OF INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC

jurisprudence. Instead of applying general legal principles, panels find themselves analyzing
disputes on a highly detailed case-by-case basis.
This change did not occur overnight and was arguably due to the interplay of several
different factors. One of the most important factors that contributed to this evolution was the
“professionalization” of GATT dispute panels in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The character of
the GATT during the 1960s was shaped by its two major “superpowers,” the United States and
the European Community. 20 Given their common stance on the “antilegalism” of the GATT,
dispute resolution came to a standstill in that decade.21
The 1970s ushered in a rejuvenation of the GATT’s dispute settlement system. The major
event effecting this shift toward “legalization” was the Tokyo Round of 1979, which hosted
negotiations of several new “MTN Codes” (multilateral trade negotiation) that required a
stronger dispute settlement procedure.22 The combination of a renewed interest in dispute
settlement, the 1979 reforms, and the desire for clearer rules led to the reinvention of the GATT
dispute settlement system. As Robert Hudec noted, “[b]y the end of the 1970s, dispute settlement
had regained a central place in GATT affairs.”23 The Uruguay Round, which commenced in
1986, perpetuated this trend by introducing binding dispute settlement.
The assertion here is not that GATT panels failed to recognize the importance of the
facts. Rather, the assertion is that the application of the rules is different in the WTO, and
includes a far more expansive use of both economic and scientific facts. Whereas GATT cases
probably settled the larger, more general principles, today’s typical WTO dispute presents
nuanced conflicts that center on factual details.
20

ROBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION
SYSTEM 12 (1993).
21
Id.
22
Id. at 13.
23
Id.

OF THE

MODERN GATT LEGAL

It is clear, however, that this jurisprudential change was set in motion far before its
effects began to surface. For example, in its discussion of the interpretation of “like or similar
products,” the 1970 Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments stated, “the
interpretation of the term should be examined on a case-by-case basis. This would allow a fair
assessment in each case of the different elements that constitute a ‘similar’ product.”24
However, WTO panels that examined this same issue approached their analysis in a much
more exhaustive fashion. In its October 1996 report in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages the
WTO Appellate Body stated:
The criteria in Border Tax Adjustments should be examined, but there can
be no one precise and absolute definition of what is "like". The concept of
"likeness" is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. The
accordion of "likeness" stretches and squeezes in different places as
different provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The width of the
accordion in any one of those places must be determined by the particular
provision in which the term "like" is encountered as well as by the context
and the circumstances that prevail in any given case to which that
provision may apply.25
This passage, among similar passages from other cases, changed the nature of analysis required
of panels. Instead of rote application of principles, panels must interpret the provisions of WTO
agreements in a highly contextualized manner and must also consider the facts and
“circumstances that prevail in any given case.”26
Indeed, language such as this indicates a jurisprudential sea change from the GATT
decisions that came before it. The facts of a case carry new weight. It is important, however, to

24

Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, BISD 18S/97, ¶ 18 (emphasis added).
Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) at 21 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Japan - Alcoholic Beverages]. WTO case law
provides many such examples of deeper factual contextualization of the disputes. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report,
European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R
(March 12, 2001) at ¶ 94, ¶ 96, ¶ 101; Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Customs Classification of
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R,) (WT/DS286/AB/R (Sept. 12, 2005) at ¶ 17.
26
Japan - Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 25 at 21.
25

specify exactly what kinds of facts are important or, for the purposes herein, what kinds of facts
pose a challenge for developing countries.

2.

What kind of fact-finding is problematic?

The increasing importance of fact-finding at the WTO manifests in various ways. As the
nature of WTO dispute settlement becomes more technical, panels may need to broaden their
understanding of issues. Depending upon the type of case, parties may find the need to produce
economic and/or scientific evidence. 27 More often than not, this information is extremely
complicated and therefore resides better within the scope of specialized experts.
With the understanding that technical evidence plays an important role in dispute
settlement, parties increasingly formulate the basis for their arguments using quantitative
economic analysis. The various Alcohol cases afford three notable examples. In Japan Alcoholic Beverages II, Korea - Alcoholic Beverages, and Chile - Alcoholic Beverages, all of
which considered GATT Article III claims, the parties “adduced quantitative economic analysis
in order to strengthen their arguments on whether products were ‘directly competitive or
substitutable.’”28 Parties arguing in each case utilized econometric and non-econometric
evidence to attempt to satisfy the DSB’s criteria. 29
Cases brought under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (the “SPS Agreement”) also deal heavily in factual analysis, particularly scientific
27

It may even be difficult to obtain regular legal evidence. For example, information on the laws and regulations in
China may not be fully accessible to the public.
28
World Trade Report 2005, “Exploring the Links between Trade, Standards and the WTO,” Thematic Essay:
“Quantitative Economics in WTO Dispute Settlement,” at 191. The essay points out that “[e]conometric analysis
makes it possible to pin down whether an observed relationship between two variables is likely to be a significant
relationship or rather a coincidental one.” Id. at 193.
29
Id. at 191.

evidence. In European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, for example, the panel narrowed down three issues on which it desired the
consultation of outside experts.30 The scientific questions involved were of such a complex
nature that the European Communities recommended the panel seek advice from at least two
experts competent in at least forty-four fields of expertise. 31 The recent Appellate Body report in
European Communities – Measures Affecting Livestock and Meat (Hormones) provides another
example of heavy reliance on science. There the Appellate Body reversed the panel on several
findings because “the Panel drew too rigid a distinction between the chosen level of protection
and the ‘insufficiency’ of the relevant scientific evidence under Article 5.7 of the SPS
Agreement.”32
The provisions offering the legal basis for such use of experts by panels are peppered
throughout the WTO agreements. Article 13.2 of the DSU states: “Panels may seek information
from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the
matter.”33 Panels can also request an expert to prepare an advisory report with respect to factual
matters concerning “scientific or other technical” issues raised by the parties. 34

30

Panel Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) at ¶ 7.18.
31
Id. at ¶ 7.20. The EU listed the following fields in which it felt the experts should be competent:
“agrobiodiversity, agronomy, allergology, animal husbandry, animal pathology, biochemistry, biological diversity,
control and inspection methods, crop husbandry, DNA amplification, ecology, epidemiology, entomology,
environmental impact monitoring methods, environmental sciences, food and feed safety, gene expression, gene
sequencing, genetics, genetic modification detection methods, genomic stability, handling transport and packaging
methods, herbicide chemistry, histopathology, immunology, malherberology and weed sciences, medicine, medical
microbiology and antibiosis, molecular biology, nutrition, ornithology, phytopathology, plant breeding, plant
development, plant-microbe interactions, plant protection and residues of plant protection products, plant
reproduction and plant biology, population genetics, risk assessment and risk analysis processes, sampling methods,
soil chemistry and soil sciences, soil microbiology therapeutics, toxicology, and veterinary medicine.” Id.
32
Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute,
WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008) at ¶ 733 [hereinafter EC - Hormones].
33
DSU, supra note 12, art. 13.2.
34
Id.

Provisions for the use of experts appear outside the DSU as well. The Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (the “TBT Agreement”) allows panels to establish a group of
technical experts “[a]t the request of a party to a dispute[] or at its own initiative.”35 Article 4.5
of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the “SCM Agreement”) states that
the “panel may request the assistance of the Permanent Group of Experts” which is established
by Article 24 of that same agreement.36 Article 24.4 of the SCM Agreement also allows any
Member to consult the Permanent Group of Experts to receive an “advisory opinion . . . on the
nature of any subsidy proposed to be introduced or currently maintained by that Member.”37
Furthermore, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the “Customs Valuation Agreement”) provides in Article 19.4 that “[a]t
the request of a party . . . or on its own initiative, a panel . . . may request the Technical
Committee” to examine “questions requiring technical consideration.” 38
Also notable is article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement, which advises that for cases involving
scientific or technical issues “a panel should seek advice from experts.”39 The SPS Agreement
contains the only hortatory language with respect to a panel’s consultation with experts, and
suggests that the drafters foresaw the complicated nature of the disputes under that agreement.
Developing country concerns regarding experts, however, do not arise from scientists or
economists appointed by panels. Instead, developing countries face difficulties from the
35

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 121 (Cambridge University Press 1999), art. 14.2 [hereinafter TBT].
36
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, art. 4.5 [hereinafter SCM].
37
Id. at art. 24.4.
38
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 172 (Cambridge University Press 1999), art. 19.4
[hereinafter Customs Valuation Agreement].
39
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, art. 11.2, emphasis added [hereinafter
SPS].

increasing need for parties to hire experts for research and testimony to support their cases.40 As
the text of the SCM Agreement and Customs Valuation Agreement indicates, some provisions
permit parties to request that experts examine or analyze evidence presented before the panel,
and sometimes they can also request that the various technical committees provide advisory
reports on complicated subjects.
While these provisions may appear helpful for developing countries, they neglect to
address the crucial stages of pre-litigation investigation and preparatory work. The WTO
agreements contemplate reference to experts once a matter is already before the panel, but they
do not provide such services in the pre-litigation stages, such as when a developing country may
be analyzing whether or not to bring a case at all. This key step of cost-benefit analysis is often
overlooked.
As discussed above, the authority to conduct broad fact-finding resides within the
capacity of panels. Basic evidence in a dispute, such as an administrative record in an antidumping proceeding or a subsidies case, is generally available, and therefore should not be
difficult to obtain. The excerpted provisions on resorting to expert analysis, however, fail to
address the need for collection of technical evidence prior to the litigation itself.
As reflected in the text of the agreements, the WTO negotiators confirmed that factfinding is indeed important. The agreements also demonstrate that technical fact-finding, in
particular, presents new challenges for WTO litigants. But the questions remain: why does this
put developing countries at a disadvantage? How much can the singular issue of fact-finding
contribute to the participation level of developing countries?
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See generally Joost Pauwelyn, The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 325 (2002)
(explaining that under the WTO framework, the use of experts has become much more common).

3.

Fact-finding is expensive

Without considering the cost of fact-finding specifically, the general cost of litigation in
front of the WTO is already high, and more so if a private law firm is hired. In some estimations,
private law firms can charge anywhere from $250 to $1,000 per hour in fees, leading to total fees
anywhere between $100,000 to over $1,000,000.41 These figures, however, probably represent
rather conservative estimates, even for a relatively simple case.42
The prices only increase for complex cases, such as Japan - Photographic Film, where
legal fees charged to Kodak and Fuji were reportedly in excess of 10 million dollars.43 Others
estimate that law firms’ hourly rates are even higher, and include the fact that firms also charge
for additional, non-legal expenses. According to Håkan Nordström, chief economist of Sweden’s
National Board of Trade, “first class law firms fly first class and stay at first class hotels.”44 It
has been estimated that the costs of supporting such litigation with data collection, economic
analysis, and the hiring of experts as testifying witnesses could increase the base cost by up to
$100,000 or $200,000.45
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A.

Private firm price data for hiring experts

A Washington, D.C.-based attorney who works for a private law firm quoted prices for
hiring experts that reflect the large expenses cited above. In a complex agricultural subsidies case
that went before both the panel and the Appellate Body, his firm found it necessary to hire an
economic expert. Given the complicated factual nature of the case, the lawyers needed the expert
to conduct economic modeling and projections. For his services, the expert charged
USD$250,000 in fees.46 With regular legal fees in this case in excess of a million dollars, the
client obviously paid a hefty bill.
The attorney was careful to point out that USD$250,000 is not a typical expert price tag,
but that it depended on various factors. First, he pointed out that this was a politically sensitive
case. Given the overall importance of the interests involved, the client did not feel that
USD$250,000 was too high a price. He also explained that, for a case that went before both the
panel and the Appellate Body, this price was not unreasonable. If the legal fees had been closer
to USD$300,000 or USD$400,000, then the firm would have considered this particular economic
expert overly expensive. The fees of experts, he explained, need to be considered in the context
of the overall cost of the case.47
Second, he explained that part of what raised the price tag for this particular expert was
his specialization. Experts on discreet issues of law usually range from between USD$50,000 to
USD$100,000, with anything more that USD$100,000 being expensive. Fees for damages
experts, on the other hand, typically run for about half a million dollars. It depends on the level

46
47

Telephone Interview with Washington, D.C.-based attorney at private law firm (Oct. 20, 2008).
Id.

of expertise of the expert, the attorney explained. “In an agricultural case, you need an expert in
agricultural economics, not just any economist.”48
Finally, he argued that experts are not that common in WTO cases. He agreed that SPS
cases often require expert testimony and analysis, but felt that these types of cases were rare. 49
Even if this has been the case, the landscape of WTO jurisprudence is changing. As Scott
Andersen, the managing partner in Sidley Austin Brown & Wood’s Geneva office stated, WTO
dispute settlement is “shaped by increasingly fact-intensive cases.” He noted the recent examples
of the United States – Upland Cotton and Korea – Commercial Vessels (under the SCM
Agreement), as well as increasing disputes under the SPS Agreement, and believes they reflect
the growing trend discussed herein toward more factually complex disputes.50 If this trend
continues, reliance on experts will be increasingly necessary.

B.

ACWL price data for hiring experts

The Advisory Centre on WTO Law is a Geneva-based legal service organization that
provides subsidized legal assistance to developing countries. 51 The Centre’s figures for expert
retainer fees are also high, though the prices are made slightly more affordable for developing
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countries by the ACWL’s varying subsidization of the cost.52 In a 2004 case under the SPS
Agreement, the ACWL retained a scientific expert during the investigative portion of the
proceedings (pre-litigation) for approximately 4,000 Swiss francs, but the matter never went
before a panel. The ACWL explained that “[o]f course, the expert’s costs would have been
higher had the matter gone to a panel and if we needed to engage him to conduct more detailed
work.”53
In 2005, the ACWL retained the services of a former Department of Commerce officer
who provided expert evidence on the conduct of an anti-dumping investigation, and the officer
charged 2,000 Swiss francs. 54 In a 2008 case under the Customs Valuation Agreement, the
ACWL retained an external auditor to provide information as to how the respondent’s customs
valuation procedures operated in practice. The auditor charged 4,000 Swiss francs. An economist
for an agricultural case that same year charged 4,000 Swiss francs as well. 55
Perhaps the most incredible of the expert price tags, though, was for a 2005 agricultural
dispute in which the ACWL retained the services of an economist and an external auditor. The
economist charged approximately 30,000 Swiss francs for his services and the external auditor
charged approximately 6,000 Swiss francs. 56 Although the ACWL represented more than one
developing country in this case, and therefore a more complicated factual scenario probably
existed, one must keep in mind that these figures represent only a portion of the litigation costs.
When one factors in other investigative expenditures as well as ACWL fees, it is not difficult to
understand the steeply escalating costs that developing countries face.
52
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The private firm cost estimates for hiring experts are usually higher than those cited by
the ACWL. According to the ACWL, there may be two reasons for this differential. First, the
ACWL provides services to countries in various stages of development. As a matter of policy,
the Centre tries to negotiate the best possible rates with experts as the costs are shared by the
country represented at a percentage equal to their category of development classification. One
senior lawyer explained, “We advise the experts that we are acting for a developing country and
that sometimes makes them give us a better rate.”57 The lawyer did point out, however, that this
is not always the case. 58
Second, the ACWL usually retains experts to assist on discrete issues, maintaining as
narrow a focus as possible to reduce costs. They also strive to engage local experts whenever
possible. Local experts may be more familiar with the industry in question and, as the ACWL
lawyer explained, “their fees are lower than what one would expect in North America or
Europe.”59
Even if the expert costs cited by the ACWL do not seem overly burdensome, one must
consider three factors that exacerbate the costs for developing countries. First, more than one
expert may be necessary to produce and testify as to the evidence in any given case. The 2004
SPS case mentioned above is a perfect example. As the ACWL explained, the price in that
scenario only contemplated pre-litigation issues. The expert would have needed to engage in
deeper analysis had the matter gone before a panel, and there would have been a corresponding
rise in his price.
Second, spending the equivalent of 4,000 to 30,000 Swiss francs or more on one expert
may not seem out of the ordinary for a U.S. law firm (or the client paying that bill), but
57
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considering the relative size of a developing country’s economy and government budget, these
additional fact-finding costs are higher than for a developed country. As Shaffer explains,
developing countries face significantly higher relative costs in WTO disputes.60 Due to their
limited budgets, financial investment in WTO legal expertise makes less sense.
Furthermore, as a matter of absolute costs, WTO litigation is more expensive for
developing countries because, due to less frequent participation, “they do not benefit from
economies of scale.”61 Indeed, due to their less frequent participation, it is unlikely that
developing countries have ready access to experts.62 They probably have to obtain their experts
on an ad hoc basis, which likely raises the “start-up costs” for each particular case.63 A third
consideration for developing countries with respect to fact-finding is that these costs are in
addition to the already pricey general legal services mentioned above.

C.

Additional ACWL efforts

To help defray the expenses of fact-finding and hiring experts, the ACWL maintains a
Technical Expertise Fund.64 The Technical Expertise Fund operates externally from the regular
budget of the ACWL. This indicates the ACWL’s recognition that fact-finding, separate and
apart from general litigation costs, strains the resources of developing countries. To date, only
three WTO Members have contributed or pledged contributions to the Technical Expertise Fund.
Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands contributed 373,160, 250,000 and 85,000 Swiss francs,

60

SHAFFER (2006) supra note 14, at 186.
Id.
62
MEAGHER, supra note 15, at 219.
63
Id.
64
See Advisory Centre on WTO Law, Technical Expertise Fund, http://www.acwl.ch/e/dispute/technical_e.aspx
(last visited Oct. 25, 2008).
61

respectively, for a total of 708,160 Swiss francs currently in the Fund. 65 According to the ACWL
website, developing countries can access the Fund at virtually any stage of the process (at the
early investigative stage or during the panel process, etc).66 The website also notes that the
Technical Expertise Fund is of particular value for “fact-intensive” disputes such as those under
the SPS or TBT Agreements.67
With only three contributing Members, the resources of the Technical Expertise Fund
remain impressive. Yet with the WTO membership surpassing 150 countries, this scant
participation is disappointing. The same argument can be made regarding supporters of the
ACWL itself. To date, major economic powers such as the United States, the EC, and Japan have
declined to make financial contributions to support the Centre.68 The lack of developed country
involvement in and support for the Centre is not surprising. However, as the proposals in the
following section argue, the lack of system access for developing countries threatens the
legitimacy of the entire system. It can be argued, therefore, that supporting the ACWL is actually
in the interests of all WTO Members.

4.

Is it just about money?

Some Members of developing country delegations to the WTO have expressed the view
that, more than any other factor, the WTO dispute settlement system is about money, and
“whoever has the most wins.”69 The problem of fact-finding illustrates this point well. Indeed, it
65
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might even be the case that, similar to U.S. litigation, the wealthier party in a WTO dispute can
“bury” their opponent in the factual evidence it has gathered.
Yet it should be pointed out that not all WTO-system participants feel that fact-finding
poses a substantial barrier for developing countries. Or, they agree that fact-finding creates
difficulties, but view other intervening causes as more influential. The next section examines
institutional problems stemming from the lack of developing country procedural mechanisms by
which private industry can petition the government to bring WTO complaints. It also considers
the problem of traditional notions of public and private sector roles in WTO litigation. Even as
nearly every WTO participant agrees that fact-finding must be addressed, most feel that
underlying and exacerbating the problem of facts is the systemic problem addressed below.

b.

The missing link between private industry and government

As one developing country Member stated, “[the] capacity to bring or defend a case is
about the ability to find facts; this is how you establish a case. It is on this premise that the entire
system is based.”70 The previous section left no doubt that developing countries face an uphill
struggle with obtaining WTO-dedicated resources for fact-finding. Yet to view this problem in
isolation fails to recognize the entire picture. On top of the money problem, the problems of law
and politics converge on the situation of developing countries, amplifying the difficulties they
have with dispute settlement access.
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1.

The lack of a procedural petition mechanism

Interviews with various representatives from the WTO system yielded a diverse
collection of viewpoints. Yet the results with respect to at least one issue were virtually the same:
regardless of their “sector,” all interviewees agreed that developing countries lack sufficient
procedural mechanisms to initiate WTO disputes.71 More specifically, most developing countries
do not provide a formal petition method by which private industry (exporters, mainly) can lobby
the government to initiate a complaint on its behalf.72
According to one interviewee, most Latin American and African WTO Members have no
method of communication, let alone a formal mechanism. Instead, trade policy decisions rest on
having the right kinds of connections. As the interviewee stated, “[i]f the case is compelling
enough, and if the industry is big enough, then the government will bring a case.”73
Unfortunately, this suggests that smaller industries, including fledgling entities trying to establish
a presence, do not receive adequate attention from their governments.
Why is this missing procedural mechanism so pivotal for developing countries to obtain?
The answer lies with one of the defining characteristics of the WTO dispute settlement system:
standing. Under WTO law, only Member states have standing to bring or defend a complaint.74
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Private persons or organizations are not permitted to bring claims, meaning government-initiated
complaints afford the only pathway to seeking relief.
That the ability of private persons and entities (arguably those who are most affected by
international trade) to raise awareness of trade issues is hampered by procedural shortcomings is
troubling. As the US – Section 301 panel stated in its report, “Trade is conducted most often and
increasingly by private operators. It is through improved conditions for these private operators
that Members benefit from WTO disciplines. The denial of benefits to a Member which flows
from a breach is often indirect and results from the impact of the breach on the market place and
the activities of individuals within it.”75
Yet governments do not have the capabilities to recognize and investigate every foreign
trade barrier affecting its domestic industries. Regardless of the oversight by administrative
agencies or departments responsible for a particular sector, potentially viable complaints can go
unnoticed or receive less priority. This means that unless the private sector has a way to notify
the government of these barriers, they will likely go unchallenged and certain WTO rights will
go unenforced.76
Though most developing countries lack such a procedural mechanism, well-established
and tested examples do exist. The United States and the EC offer what are probably the most
widely recognized (and most utilized) communication pathways between private industry and the
government. They also offer examples of the more informal public-private partnerships that will
also be discussed herein. Because the EC’s statutory equivalent surfaced later in time than the
U.S.’s Section 301, the evolution of EC policy may offer the most useful model for developing
countries. Both U.S. and EC systems are discussed below.
75
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A.

The U.S. model

The statutory petition mechanism in the United States is known as Section 301 77, and,
over time, it has engendered its fair share of controversy. 78 The U.S. was the first GATT Member
to create such a procedure, and it has often suffered attacks of being unilateralist due to its
aggressive use of the statute. Regardless of the legitimacy or fairness of how Section 301 has
been used in practice, it effectively aligns private industry interests with the government’s ability
to take action at the WTO. Shaffer describes this as “the formation of ad hoc public-private
networks to develop and exploit public international economic law in order to advance U.S.
national and commercial interests.”79
The procedure of Section 301 begins with a petition that can be filed by private firms,
trade associations or the like.80 Once private industry initiates the process, Section 301 sets forth
a course of action to be taken by the United States Trade Representative (USTR). 81 The USTR
investigates the foreign trade barriers alleged by the petition, and takes action against them if
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necessary. 82 The USTR can also self-initiate an investigation, 83 but in practice, any such
government initiation typically results from the encouragement of a private firm. 84
Authority for decision-making under Section 301 has shifted over time. Originally, the
sole discretion to make determinations under Section 301 rested with the president, and private
firms felt their interests were not being adequately addressed.85 Through effective lobbying,
however, private industry succeeded in shifting power over such issues to the newly created
USTR (created in 1962). Unlike the president, whom Congress could not call on to testify, the
USTR was subject to intense grilling by congressional committees.86 By forcing the USTR to
publicly answer to private industry (via Congress), a system of accountability was established. In
effect, now there is someone to answer for why action was or was not taken with respect to a
Section 301 petition.87
This power shift and accountability illustrates a crucial lesson for developing countries.
Through a system of responsibility that forces, in a way, the executive to answer the demands of
private industry (or at least hear those demands), the Section 301 procedure fosters a relationship
between organized private actors and the government. Any developing country seeking to create
a statutory procedure for private industry should aim to establish a similar set of checks and
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balances. As will be discussed further below, however, governments may not necessarily agree
with such automatic procedures.
In spite of Section 301’s apparent effectiveness, however, according to the USTR’s
Website, that office has not initiated a Section 301 investigation since October of 1997.88 It is
unclear whether this has resulted from a lack of petitions submitted by private industry, or from
the USTR’s decision not to take action on a particular petition. What it does suggest is a shift
from this formal mechanism to the more informal partnerships discussed below. The
consequences of that shift will be explored further in that section.

B.

The EU model

Europe’s counterpart to the USTR is the Trade Directorate-General of the European
Commission. Unlike the situation in the United States, where unilateral use of Section 301 by the
USTR assuaged any private industry concern about whether the government would fight to
protect export interests, the evolution of trade policy in the EU was more reactionary. 89 For this
reason, the EC model sets forth a more usable roadmap for institutionalizing this relationship.
The EC maintains two procedural mechanisms through which it can initiate WTO
complaints on behalf of private interests. The first method is through Article 133 of the European
Treaty. 90 The second is the more recently enacted Trade Barrier Regulation (the “TBR”), which
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the Commission adopted in 1994 just prior to the formation of the WTO.91 Although Article 133
does contemplate the participation of commercial interests and trade associations92, it is the TBR
that more closely mirrors the private role set forth in U.S. Section 301. For that reason, this
section will focus on the TBR.
Similar to Section 301, the TBR provides a petition right to individual private enterprises.
Through this mechanism, commercial interests can urge the EC to investigate possible foreign
trade barriers and initiate claims before the WTO.93 The TBR is an improved iteration of a
previous regulation known as the New Commercial Policy Instrument (the “NCPI”), which
required the support of an entire “Community industry.” 94
Through coordinated efforts governed by the TBR, European business entities and
associations partner with the EC to investigate potential claims. As TBR cases can sometimes be
factually intensive, the government depends on input provided by private industry. 95 The
relationship formed in these situations, both officially through the TBR and unofficially through
alignment of interests (as described below), is what developing countries lack.
It should be pointed out that perhaps the mere existence of Section 301 and the TBR,
more than their actual use, helps to facilitate trade policy in the U.S. and EC. One economist
interviewed emphasized this point, highlighting the fact that more than just procedural tools,
Section 301 and the TBR were political devices. As he further stated, “[i]t doesn’t matter what
91
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triggers the USTR to bring a case or not – if the USTR isn’t responsive to the U.S. export
industry’s interests, they still have the USTR’s actions on record, and can therefore engage in a
political battle.”96 Perhaps it is at this political stage when the informal relationships, discussed
below, are truly effective. If so, the lack of such relationships in developing countries forms an
additional barrier to their access to dispute resolution.

2.

Informal partnerships in the U.S. and EU

In addition to formal procedural mechanisms, the United States and EC also benefit from
a proactive private sector that encourages informal, ad hoc relationships between private industry
and governments. The U.S. and EU models represent the most widely recognized examples of
such “public-private partnerships,” and are also the most developed.97 It is important to note that
the formation of these “unofficial” relationships build largely on the official alliances fashioned
under Section 301 and TBR.
For purposes of analysis geared toward helping developing countries, it is useful to
compare the U.S. and EU models because of their divergent approaches. The U.S. tends to have
a more “bottom-up” approach, whereas the EU approach can be seen as more “top-down.”98 In
practice, Shaffer explains, this signifies that U.S. firms and trade associations take a relatively
proactive role, and in the EC, it is a more centralized authority that takes the lead. 99
U.S. public-private partnerships enjoy a longer historical legacy than those of the EU and,
for this reason, reflect a more “finished” quality. Shaffer identifies the following six elements
96
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making up the U.S. strategy: 1) coordination through trade associations, 2) public-private
exchange of information, 3) navigating the interagency 301 committee, 4) use of congressional
pressure, 5) strategic use of leverage points, and 6) ultimately, litigation before the WTO.100
Although they are understood as a rather informal process, these six strategy points suggest a
highly sophisticated relationship.
As previously mentioned, usage of U.S. Section 301 has come to a halt in the last ten
years. Not surprisingly, the number of WTO complaints filed by the U.S. has also dropped.101
Since 1997, many of the cases filed by the U.S. were probably the result of informal publicprivate initiatives incorporating some or all of the six strategies listed above. 102 While such
informal partnerships should be encouraged in developing countries, it should also be noted that
the U.S.’s transition from formal to informal mechanisms may reflect power dynamics that
prevent smaller, less connected private interests from being heard. If they begin partnershipbuilding with such an informal, network-based approach, developing countries may run the risk
of cronyism and corruption determining which complaints go forward.
By contrast to the U.S. model, the EC’s public-private architecture seems a bit more
primitive. According to Shaffer, unlike U.S firms that aggressively lobby the public sector to act,
“[a]t times the Commission has proactively sought contact with private firms, lobbying firms to
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lobby it.”103 Similar to the current situation of many developing countries, the EC lacked the
entrenched public-private linkage that already existed in the U.S. European firms, as a result,
reacted more cautiously to governmental efforts to act on its behalf. 104 However, the EC made up
for an original lack of trust between the public and private sectors with an admirable effort at
rallying commercial interests. This paper will focus on the EC’s model for fostering publicprivate partnerships with more detail in the section considering the various proposals, infra.
Developing countries, for the most part, lack any such informal structure aligning public
and private interests. In fact, the situation in many developing countries is quite the opposite.
Instead of coordinated efforts, interviews with many involved in the process suggest that it looks
a lot more like finger pointing and shrugging on the part of private industry.

3.

Entrenched private sector attitudes

Behind the procedural deficiencies plaguing developing country access is a historical and
developmental phenomenon. As the excerpt from the US – Section 301 panel above indicates,
injuries from trade barriers affect private industry first and foremost.105 In spite of this practical
reality though, developing country industries maintain the antiquated view that enforcement of
international trade policies lies solely within the domain of the government. As one interviewee
explained, “[o]ne of the biggest problems in Latin America is that industry still believes that for
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any matter related to the WTO, the government is responsible. And government should also foot
the bill.”106
In one respect, the industries are completely correct. As has already been noted,
governments, and governments only, have standing before the WTO dispute settlement body. Of
course, then it is the government’s job to actually initiate a complaint and carry a case through to
its end. But, as the U.S. and EC models analyzed above illustrate, the private sector plays a vital
role in both the initiation and development of a case, contributing resources and conducting its
own independent investigations.
As one lawyer who represents developing countries before the WTO explained, “[i]f
industry would provide financial resources, then governments could do pre-litigation.”107 He also
suggested that if the private sector would provide human resources, they could substantially
improve the government’s ability to engage in a cost-benefit analysis of whether to bring a
case.108
These attitudes must change if developing countries want to reap the same benefits from
international trade litigation as the U.S. and EU. This essential shift will be discussed in greater
detail in the section considering proposals, infra, but for purposes of this section it is important to
recognize the considerable limitation this mentality presents.

c.

The problem of political will

Given the entrenched attitudes of developing country firms described above, it might be
easy to cast blame on the private sector for many of developing countries’ dispute settlement
106
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woes. Yet the private sector is not the only culpable party. Closely linked to the private sector’s
misplaced understanding of roles is a corresponding political reluctance to take action on the part
of governments. This reluctance stems from any number of factors. This section briefly examines
governmental hesitation to act in the WTO as it arises from legal and political incapacity in the
realm of international trade and fear of political and trade reprisal.

1.

Lack of legal and political capacity in international trade

The idea of legal and political capacity to participate effectively in WTO dispute
resolution dovetails heavily with the already-discussed issue of public-private partnerships. But
the finer point here refers to establishing a WTO-dedicated bureaucracy. Perhaps due to limited
resources, the staff placed in Geneva from developing countries, if any, often lacks background
and training in international trade related matters.109 Unlike the United States and EC, whose
Geneva representatives are trade experts and specialists, developing country representatives have
typically been career foreign affairs ministers with little trade experience. 110
Let alone having a talented staff of trade experts to assume the lead on dispute matters,
some developing countries do not even have a bureaucratic presence in Geneva. 111 As of 2007,
about one-quarter of the WTO membership had no WTO mission.112 Without a point person
situated in Geneva to facilitate the filing of a WTO complaint, developing country governments
are saddled with the burden of performing all the necessary groundwork on their own. This
109
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includes any difficult fact-finding as discussed above, dedicating time to formulating an effective
litigation strategy, 113 and understanding the ramifications of an unsuccessful complaint.
Moreover, throughout the entire process a government must weigh certain political challenges
discussed next.

2.

Fear of political or trade reprisal

If a developing country government fears that by bringing a dispute to the WTO it will
jeopardize the stability of its trading relationships, it is unlikely the government will move
forward. In theory, the same might be said of any country, developed and developing. As the
Doha Development Round has demonstrated, disagreements over international trade policy
ignite heated debate.114 The trade relationships formed can be delicate, and countries may want
to avoid setting off the frail balance through disruptive contests with little gain in the end. When
one country depends on another for a crucial trade relationship, sometimes that factor outweighs
any rights they may seek to enforce at the WTO. Furthermore, even if a country brings a case to
the WTO and wins, there is no guarantee it will produce beneficial trade results.115
In practice, however, it does not appear that many developed WTO Members fear
political or trade reprisal for their dispute settlement actions. Since the inception of the WTO, the
113
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United States and EC have brought 90 and 79 complaints, respectively. 116 Even if, in the early
years of dispute settlement, political considerations actually did give pause to these two
economic powerhouses, it does not appear to hold them back now. In fact, it may be that political
imperatives actually spur larger countries into taking action at the WTO.117 The ongoing Boeing
– Airbus dispute suggests that any U.S.-EU concerns with bringing such a political dispute to the
WTO have been overcome. 118
Developing countries are yet to overcome fears of reprisal, and also suffer from internal
political squabbling over trade issues. It is difficult for a developing country to affirmatively
determine that its resources will be well spent on filing a WTO complaint when the outcome is
so uncertain. 119 Financial constraints combined with the fear of political and trade consequences,
not to mention a host of non-trade related problems, may create more internal reluctance to
dedicating time and money to WTO disputes in developing countries.120
More challenging than the internal debate, however, is the external political reality that
developing countries must navigate. Developing countries are more likely to be reliant on the
richer WTO membership not just for maintaining its trading volumes, but also for development
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assistance and other global aid initiatives.121 When facing “trade and aid friends” as potential
respondents, developing countries may prefer to avoid upsetting that relationship. Indeed, as
some commentators have put it, “[t]he associated vulnerability to extra-WTO retaliation may
decrease their willingness to invoke the DSU.”122
Developing countries also fear that overly aggressive use of dispute settlement may land
them with more counter claims, otherwise known as the “glass house” syndrome.123 It is
troublesome to imagine a situation where a developing country has a legitimate claim, but elects
not to file a complaint due to fear of retaliation. Furthermore, it turns the entire notion of the
WTO’s rule-based system on its head. As Hoekman and Mavroidis state, “concerns that bringing
a case would ‘disturb’ a country’s relationship with a major trading partner to some extent
nullifies the raison d’être of the WTO – the establishment of a rule-based as opposed to a powerbased system of trade relations.”124
It is with all of the above problems in mind, then, that the subject now turns to possible
solutions. As has already been stated, the problems of fact-finding, a lack of legal capacity, and a
challenging political environment represent a small portion of the mixed bag of developing
country issues at the WTO. They also face the challenges of balancing smaller trade volumes
with an adequate level of WTO activity, potentially insufficient remedies, as well as significant
complications in the area of “trade and” issues. 125 But if progress is to be made, it may just be
taking on one small problem at a time.
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II.

PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCING DEVELOPING COUNTRY ACCESS TO WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
With such a vast array of problems facing developing country Members of the WTO, the

right approach cannot aim to find a panacea. Rather, targeted strategies and solutions should be
employed to address ground-level problems. Each proposal suggested here aims to improve
developing country access to the WTO dispute settlement system. The proposals vary to the
extent they address the problem of fact-finding (or, more generally, money), internal legal
capacity (law), or political will (politics). This section will analyze each proposal and ultimately
determine that while some merit further exploration, others appear less feasible given other WTO
constraints.

a.

Create an institutionalized fact-finding body at the WTO

The challenges developing countries face with respect to fact-finding and with respect to
technical fact-finding in particular, require remedy. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of the
ACWL in this area, this paper has already demonstrated that due to barriers related to factfinding (among others,) developing countries often fail to seek redress for their international
trade injuries through WTO dispute settlement.
This section proposes the creation of an institutionalized fact-finding body to be included
under the umbrella of WTO standing bodies. It will first walk through the logistics of such an
institution, then analyze the pros and cons of this approach.

1.

What would an institutionalized fact-finding body look like?

David Collins, a lecturer at the City University of London Law School, has argued for a
“standing agency to conduct fact-finding in order to correct evidentiary deficiencies in
submissions by Members to panels during dispute settlement.”126 While there is more to the factfinding problem than deficiencies of submissions, this idea is compelling. 127
Collins suggests setting up the fact-finding body so as to fit within the pre-existing right
that panels already have under DSU Article 13 to seek information. Alternatively, he posits that
such a body’s mandate could derive from international law generally, where tribunals are
typically granted a wide scope for investigation. 128 The duty of such a fact-finding agency would
be to “clarify existing facts as well as ascertain missing information helpful to the rendering of
judgment.”129
As Collins envisions it, the body would not analyze nor editorialize the information it
collected. Rather, it would function at the behest of the panel when the panel or parties felt that
information was insufficient.130 Quite effectively, Collins manages to couch his proposal as a
“remedial” option as opposed to being advocacy-based. As he clarifies, “[the body] would step in
to address inadequacies in the evidence as submitted by the parties for the purpose of fully
informed decision-making.”131
If the goal is to help developing countries both before and during dispute settlement
proceedings, however, it seems Collins’ proposal may fall short. Perhaps a better source of
126
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authority for such a body can be found under DSU Article 27.2. This article recognizes the need
to “provide additional legal advice and assistance in respect of dispute settlement to developing
country Members.”132 It requires the WTO Secretariat, with its concomitant role of assisting
panels and providing support, to “make available a qualified legal expert from the WTO
technical cooperation services to any developing country Member which so requests.”133
If an institutionalized fact-finding body is created, the mandate should be found under
Article 27.2. Whether the body is formed pursuant to the need for “assistance in respect of
dispute settlement,” or under the auspices of the WTO technical cooperation services, it seems
that developing country interests would be better served by a body under Secretariat supervision
that could engage in the pre-litigation stage as well as during the proceedings.

2.

The pros and cons of an institutionalized fact-finding body

As a preliminary matter, an institutionalized fact-finding body at the WTO would go a
long way toward satisfying what many otherwise view as empty commitments to recognize the
special and different situation of developing countries at the WTO. The special and differential
treatment provisions have been, for the most part, a disappointment. 134 By creating a WTO
institution under DSU Article 27.2 whose mandate would be to aid developing countries
engaging in fact-finding at both the pre-litigation and litigation stages, the WTO would gain
legitimacy in the eyes of many disenfranchised Members.
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Furthermore, a fact-finding body formed under the umbrella of the Secretariat would
accomplish two related goals through the same action. As it engaged with developing countries
in the fact-finding process, it would simultaneously transfer to them legal knowledge and
capacity to better recognize WTO violations, and more effectively gather evidence. Although the
Secretariat does already provide training through its trade-related technical assistance (“TRTA”)
activities, amongst other programs, 135 it could expand its dedication to developing country issues
by engaging in the fact-finding itself, thereby relieving some of the burden.
As promising as such an institutionalized body may appear, however, there are many
arguments against it. First and foremost, regardless of how appropriately an institutionalized
fact-finding body may seem to fit into either DSU Article 27.2 or Article 13, such a body likely
falls outside the WTO Secretariat’s mandate. Numerous interviewees reiterated this point. As
one private firm attorney stated, “[t]he WTO is a Member-driven organization, and the neutrality
of the Secretariat is sacred, very closely guarded. Any ‘body’ that would gather information that
could be used against other Members would almost be a non-starter.”136 A senior trade specialist
from the Organization of American States felt that a Secretariat- or WTO-based body would
suffer from a lack of legitimacy and trust.137 Additionally, the chief economist at the Swedish
National Board of Trade has said that with the important advisory role the Secretariat already has
to panels and the Appellate Body, “[i]t would make a mockery of the dispute settlement system
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if the Secretariat would advise also the parties to the dispute.”138 Trust would be difficult to
establish for both developed and developing countries.
Commentators similarly reflect the understanding expressed by the interviewees that the
neutrality of the Secretariat is of paramount importance. As Shaffer describes it, “WTO
Members and the WTO Secretariat often refer to the WTO as a ‘contract organization.’ By
contract organization, they refer to a ‘member-driven’ institution.”139 The Secretariat, therefore,
understands its role as one of facilitation, not advocacy.
To his credit, Collins recognized the need for impartial decision making in WTO
disputes. He crafted his solution with the understanding that the fact-finding arm of the WTO
would be independent of the decision-making arm, and he also envisioned the makeup of the
body to be based on Member appointments to avoid the apprehension of bias. What Collins
failed to anticipate, though, was that separation from the panels was not enough. Mere
association with the WTO itself probably makes an institutionalized fact-finding body infeasible.
This proposal also suffers from logistical shortcomings. For one, does the WTO really
need more bureaucracy?140 As a senior staff member of the ACWL stated, “[w]hat would be the
incremental value of another fact-finding institution?”141 And who would fund such a body? If
the United States and EC are yet to financially support the ACWL, they are unlikely to fund a
WTO institution aimed at helping developing countries launch cases against them. In spite of the
good idea behind it, the proposal for an institutionalized WTO fact-finding body is probably a
non-starter.
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b.

Formalize the discovery process

As a dovetail to the previous proposal, this section proposes the formalization of a
discovery process in WTO dispute settlement. Currently the DSU provides no rules of evidence
for the parties or the panel to follow, even in the panel working procedures. This gap includes
any rules that might cover admissibility, production, or sufficiency of evidence.”142
From a developing country perspective, the lack of formal discovery rules can have both
positive and negative consequences. For example, parties to a dispute enjoy the right to present
any evidence they deem relevant, without having to argue it into admissibility. 143 Hopefully this
means that, on the whole, more time is spent examining important facts and that relevant
evidence is not kept out due to overly strict rules.
On the other hand, because the rules on the timing of evidentiary submissions are also
lax, there is the opportunity for parties to continue introducing new evidence as the dispute
moves forward. As Andersen notes, “[i]t is not unusual in fact-intensive cases for more exhibits
to be filed by the complaining party after it files its first submission than were included in its first
submission.”144
An even larger problem facing developing countries, though, appears when a
counterparty refuses to submit evidence. Perhaps the weakest link in the void of WTO rules of
evidence is a panel’s inability to compel a party to produce evidence within its exclusive
control.145 This deficiency is particularly relevant for developing countries, which already face
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an uphill battle discussed herein to produce their own evidence. If a wealthier counterparty can
further manipulate the disparity in resources by “failing” to provide evidence, it forces
developing countries to do even more scrambling.

1.

Recommendations on formalizing discovery

As a potential solution to these problems, this section recommends that the WTO
formalize its discovery process. This would include setting forth rules of evidence, but would
focus less on rules of admissibility and more on the ability of a panel to compel evidence. 146 It
also argues that where the DSU “permits” or “suggests” that a panel refer to experts, it in fact
should say “shall.”
For a frame of reference, one could look to the rules of discovery and fact-finding
exercised in international arbitration. The International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (“ISCID”) provides in Arbitration Rule 34(2)(a) that "[t]he Tribunal may, if it deems it
necessary at any stage of the proceeding: call upon the parties to produce documents, witnesses
and experts.”147 Unlike WTO panels, which cannot compel parties to act but only “seek
information” under DSU Article 13.1, ICSID arbiters can order a party to produce evidence.
Even after the Appellate Body’s 1999 interpretation of DSU Article 13.1 in Canada –
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, a formalization of discovery could improve
access to information in WTO disputes, particularly for developing countries. DSU Article 13.1
states, “[a] Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such
146
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information as the panel considers necessary and appropriate.”148 In Canada - Aircraft the
Appellate Body stated: “we are of the view that the word "should" in the third sentence of Article
13.1 is, in the context of the whole of Article 13, used in a normative, rather than a merely
exhortative, sense.”149
In spite of the Appellate Body’s admonition, parties have, from time to time, thwarted a
panel’s request for information. 150 While a panel is authorized draw adverse inferences from
such a failure to produce evidence, they have shown a reluctance to do so.151 This reluctance is
appropriate, if indeed the goal is to settle controversies based on all the facts. As Collins put it,
“[w]hile an adverse inference may offer some assistance in arriving upon a determination of fact,
independent verification of evidence through investigation would be infinitely more useful from
the perspective of completeness and accuracy.”152 To avoid situations where drawing an adverse
inference is the only remedy, then, the WTO should formalize discovery through a provision in
the DSU that requires parties to comply with requests for evidence. Failure to comply could be
penalized through sanctions, similar to those applied under U.S. rules of procedure.
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Additionally, this section proposes that a panel should be required to use experts in every
case concerning a covered agreement with expert provisions (the SPS, TBT, SCM and Customs
Valuation Agreements). As discussed above, the increasingly complex and technical nature of
disputes requires more than just legal and institutional knowledge to resolve them. Therefore, it
should be assumed that if the DSU drafters thought to provide panels the opportunity to refer to
experts, panels should be compelled to do so. The hope is that results in highly technical cases
would improve due to better understanding of the nature of the dispute.

2.

Problems with formalizing discovery

There are several drawbacks to this approach. First, formalizing the discovery process
would probably lead to delays in the dispute settlement process. If panels required a party to
produce evidence, and a financial censure ensued due to lack of compliance, this would only
increase the time required to settle the dispute. There would be a similar result from compelling
panels to use experts. Many Members feel the WTO DSB already suffers from overly drawn out
dispute proceedings, and formalizing discovery would only lengthen the process.
Second, formalizing the discovery process would likely increase the costs of dispute
settlement for all participants. If disputes take longer to resolve, this translates into more billable
hours for the expensive legal counsel, not to mention the cost to the institution itself for referring
to experts in more cases. Furthermore, by requiring panels to refer to experts in every SPS, TBT,
SCM, and Customs Valuation case the DSB runs the risk of turning the adjudicatory power over
to experts.

More importantly, even if formalizing discovery is aimed at aiding developing country
participation, there is always the danger that the process could be turned around and used against
them. If a developing country did not produce information required by a panel simply because it
was unable, then sanctions for lack of compliance would seem to have the opposite of the desired
effect of increasing developing country participation in dispute settlement.
The weakness of this proposal may also stem from its attempt at over-legalization of the
WTO dispute settlement system. Ultimately, the WTO remains a diplomatic forum. Less
restrictive procedural rules allow for flexibility in the context of political negotiations. Despite
concerns regarding production of evidence and insufficient use of experts, it is unlikely that
formalization of discovery will truly facilitate more developing country participation.

c.

Foster public-private partnerships

Perhaps the factor that most hinders developing countries from participating in WTO
dispute settlement is their failure to employ both formal and informal linkages between the
private sector and the government. As discussed above, such relationships are the primary basis
by which the United States and the EC bring most cases to the WTO. Every WTO participant
interviewed for this article identified the communication breakdown between industry and
government as a major barrier for developing country access.153
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1.

A procedural mechanism

To remedy this inadequacy, developing countries could adopt legislation (by whatever
means necessary within each individual political system) creating a formal petition mechanism
for private industries. While this would probably be the most efficient means of initially
catapulting developing country access to dispute settlement, it is also the most difficult.
Assuming all developing countries would be amenable to creating such a right, such an
undertaking would require a careful examination of each country’s internal legislative process. 154
Creating an effective procedural mechanism is not impossible, though, and developing
countries have a good model in the experience of the EU. Since the Commission did not enact
the TBR until 1994, the EU’s more recent experience provides a chronologically relevant
roadmap for developing countries to mimic. Again, though, such drastic legislative action would
take efforts not just by the private sector in the form of pressure, but more importantly would
require governments to willingly engage in the groundwork to get it passed.
Much more likely than government cooperation, however, would be opposition to the
idea. By instituting a procedural right of petition, a government would thereby obligate itself to
be responsive to any such petition, and it would also make a dispute that was initiated more
difficult to stop if it became necessary or politically convenient to do so. If a government already
shows reluctance to bring a WTO case for financial or political reasons without a formalized
procedure, it is highly unlikely they would ever obligate themselves as such.
Furthermore, to function effectively, a formal petition mechanism would still rely heavily
on informal public-private partnerships. These relationships facilitate better trade policy
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regardless of the existence of a formal procedural mechanism, and therefore this proposal
focuses on providing a foundation to build the necessary public-private alliance.

2.

Foundations for public-private partnership

A.

Collaboration among private sector entities

This proposal offers three methods to cultivate relationships between the public and
private sectors. First, private commercial interests in developing countries need to create broadbased collaborative efforts among sectors. As Shaffer explains, the increasingly legalized nature
of the WTO system requires the dedication of “significantly more time, expense and effort” than
ever before.155 Considering the resources necessary, not to mention the political capital to be
spent, the arm of government focusing on trade policy will be much more receptive to the needs
of a collective sectoral interest, as opposed to just one company. 156
To this end, private entities in developing countries should focus on taking collective
action through trade associations. But developing countries should also expand typical notions of
private sector joint ventures to include academia, think tanks, consultancies, and civil society.157
A relevant model for developing countries to follow here would be that of Brazil, one of the most
active (and advanced) developing countries in WTO dispute settlement.158 In response to
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increased liberalization of Brazil’s market as well as foreign markets, Brazilian trade
associations undertook coordinated efforts to communicate their input on trade issues to the
government.159 Simultaneously, academic and for-profit ventures organized in an effort to assist
both the Brazilian government and the private sector in developing international trade policy
positions that would aid in negotiations. 160

B.

Effective exchange of information

Second, once private industry has successfully organized, it must engage in the effective
exchange of information with the government. As a Senior Staff Member at the ACWL
explained, “[t]he export industries in developing countries usually know which obstacles they
face when attempting to enter into other countries’ markets.”161 The challenge, then, is using that
information in a way that protects any WTO rights that might be violated by such obstacles.
Due to limited resources, a government will need to rely heavily on the private sector.
Developing country governments will depend not only on the private sector’s superior ability to
collect information about foreign trade barriers, but also on its ability to organize that
information. 162 Since the industry will be relying on the government to then turn around and
utilize the organized information to defend the industry’s interest, both sides should have the
incentive to cooperate.163 In the United States, Shaffer explains, “[f]irms are, in many ways, the
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USTR’s eyes . . . firms know best the impact of a trade restriction on the market in which they
operate or wish to enter.”164
To more effectively facilitate this exchange of information between commercial entities
and governments, firms should rely on the assistance of private legal counsel. Even if a company
or trade association can recognize a trade barrier and identify the potential claim involved,
resources will be more efficiently utilized if private lawyers formulate the legal arguments. This
is an expense that private firms or trade associations should bear if they want to equalize their
country’s access to WTO dispute settlement. Most commentators argue that private sector
investment has, up to this point, been insufficient, but some suggest that larger industry
associations are already doing this.165
One additional method through which government and industry should collaborate and
communicate would be the Trade Policy Review (“TPR”) process to which every WTO Member
must submit at a frequency based upon its share of world trade. The goal of the TPR process is to
enhance transparency of each Member’s trade policies, and administration of this mechanism
generally falls within the responsibilities of the WTO Secretariat.166 Member country
governments have two essential roles to play in TPR: they prepare a policy statement for the
Trade Policy Review Body (“TPRB”) to review, and they are asked to cooperate with the
Secretariat in preparation of its report.167 Throughout both stages of this process, developing
country governments should recruit the aid of private industry.168 The benefits would run in both
directions: government would receive much-needed support in gathering relevant information for
164
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the report, and industry would receive exposure to trade policy generally and be given the
opportunity to weigh in on domestic trade policy matters.

C.

A strategic private industry presence

Finally, private industry needs to establish a presence at the international trade table.
Specifically, firms need to delegate at least one official or representative to attend the frequent
conferences and seminars held on trade issues worldwide.169 The WTO, World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, as well as many private organizations, all dedicate resources to
gathering information about WTO-relevant policies, producing papers with an analysis of the
issues, and then presenting the information to governments at conferences or through
dissemination of the papers.170 It is crucial that commercial interests create a presence for
themselves here, including assigning resources for processing the information once received.171
Here again, the case of Brazil is illustrative. In 1997, Brazil hosted the Summit of the
Americas in Belo Horizonte, which gathered government leaders but also included a coincident
“Business Forum” to converge government officials and business leaders.172 Members from the
business side made proposals representing their interests and formed partnerships with other
business sectors with an aim toward collectively focusing on trade negotiations. 173 The coalition
of business formed at the summit later organized working groups on trade topics and drafted
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trade policy position papers. 174 Remarking on the landmark success of the coalition formed, two
commentators noted that one of the most important results of the summit and eventual business
coalition “was an autonomous expression of the business community with respect to the
Brazilian government. Therefore it helped to determine a trade agenda based on a different
rationale.”175
If successful, the creation of effective public-private networks could finally begin to close
the gap in access to WTO dispute settlement. The difficulty with such an approach is the
groundswell of mobilization it requires to move forward. The case of Brazil resulted from a
historic effort on the part of many actors, along with a collective desire to change Brazil’s
relationship with WTO disputes. Each part of this proposal requires the participation of more
than just governments and private industry – it also relies on contributions from lawyers and law
firms, international organizations, civil society, and perhaps even law schools through the use of
clinics. Unfortunately, given the current entrenched “it’s-the-government’s-problem” attitude
found in the private sector of many developing countries, a political and cultural shift would
need to occur before the mobilization necessary to create these networks could be realized.

d.

Small claims procedure

Giving consideration to the high costs of litigating before the WTO, and the amplification
of those costs with respect to developing countries, this section proposes the introduction of a
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“small claims” procedure to the WTO dispute settlement process.176 The benefit of such a
procedure would be to carve out a less costly, less time-consuming procedure for smaller-stakes
claims at the WTO, with the aim of facilitating more developing country access to dispute
resolution.
According to Håkan Nordström, the seeds for some type of small claims resolution
already exist. He highlights three DSU provisions that may contemplate the idea of small claims,
even if not discussed as such. First, DSU Article 5 allows parties to voluntarily undertake the
procedures of good offices, conciliation, and/or mediation.177 Each of these methods would
provide a less costly route to dispute resolution if successful. Additionally, if the parties agree,
DSU Article 5.5 allows for the continuation of any of these procedures while the panel process
moves forward.178 Obviously the hope would be to resolve the dispute before the panel
progresses very far.
Second, DSU Article 25 provides for “[e]xpeditious arbitration . . . as an alternative
means of dispute settlement . . . subject to mutual agreement of the parties.”179 As Nordström
explains, arbitration could be a cheaper and quicker resolution than that provided by a panel, but
to date Article 25 has never been invoked as an alternative to a panel.180
Finally, Nordström highlights the accelerated procedures of the Decision of 5 April 1966
(BISD 14S/18), now encompassed by DSU Article 3.12.181 This provision has also never been
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used. In fact, according to lawyers familiar with DSU procedures, most developing country
representatives see no benefit from this acceleration and believe its shorter deadlines would be
detrimental to their preparation of a case.182
Nonetheless, Nordström and Shaffer took the small claims proposal a step further,
suggesting eight potential design features that such a procedure could have. 183 This section will
highlight four of those features: streamlined procedures (including appellate review of rulings
only via petition), rulings with no precedential effect, a permanent small claims body, and
limiting availability of the procedure to a defined subset of the WTO Membership.184
Throughout this analysis, the reader should bear in mind the underlying conceptual difficulty
pointed out by Nordström and Shaffer. That is, “can we define a “small claim” in a context
where government policies are being disputed?” 185 Those writers consider that a claim’s
monetary value, the existence of precedent for the dispute and the identity of the parties involved
should be threshold issues in defining a small claim. 186

1.

Streamlined procedures

If asked about the causes for high priced litigation at the WTO, many Members would
first indicate the issue of time. Specifically, they would point out the many delays in WTO
182

Interview with attorney practicing at the WTO (Nov. 21, 2008). Nordström & Shaffer, supra note 176, at 32.
Nordström & Shaffer, supra note 177, at 1.
184
Id. Nordström and Shaffer also lay out a detailed case in favor of a small claims procedure generally, examining
similar systems in both the United States and EU contexts, as well as the international setting. See id. at 3-25. This
paper combines two of Nordström and Shaffer’s elements – streamlining procedures and appellate review only via
petition. The three design features not included here are maintaining any small claim procedure separate from
traditional procedures (as an alternative, not a replacement), the various suggested remedies for small claims and
experimenting with a small claims procedure on a trial basis. Id. at 1. These features were not included because,
while practical, it was felt that the other recommendations provided sufficient basis for discussion of this
recommendation.
185
Id. at 1. The authors point out that unlike the parallel small claims procedures in other types of civil proceedings,
WTO proceedings are not between private parties, but governments. Id. at 27.
186
Id. at 28-33 (discussing three criteria for consideration in determining what is a small claim).
183

dispute proceedings, and how that lag increases costs for final settlement. If the goal of a small
claims procedure is to reduce costs related to WTO litigation, streamlining procedures in dispute
settlement seems an appropriate area in which to make adjustments.
William Davey has already made several suggestions for expediting WTO procedures,
and Nordström and Shaffer make the case for their applicability to a small claims procedure.
Davey suggested the DSB should meet only once before establishing a panel rather than twice,
the establishment of a permanent body of panelists, actual adherence to submission deadlines
(and perhaps a modifications of these timelines), and removal of the stage of interim review.187
In practice, these adjustments may not save much time. Additionally, Nordström and Shaffer
recommend limiting party filings, oral hearings, the page numbers of party submissions, and the
length of decisions.188 These changes may indeed expedite the process, especially if the sections
on recitation of the facts and the parties’ arguments are removed. 189
Two supplementary recommendations are offered herein. First, small claims procedures
should not be subject to the same confidentiality provisions as regular disputes.190 The strict
confidentiality of the DSU’s regular proceedings has been criticized as reducing overall
transparency. If small claims would involve less of a monetary stake as well as issues with
precedent, parties may be willing to relax the confidentiality rules. More transparent proceedings
would contribute to a more timely result. Business confidential information (“BCI”), of course,
would remain an exception.
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Second, a small claims procedure should limit or exclude third party rights. Currently,
third parties are permitted to present their views in the first substantive meeting of the parties,
lengthening the duration of disputes.191 Given the nature of a small claim, third party rights
would not likely be implicated. If third party rights were implicated, the lack of precedential
effect for small claims rulings (to be discussed below) would mean those interests would not be
significantly altered.
Finally, Nordström and Shaffer argue that automatic appeal should not be available for
small claims decisions.192 Instead, to avoid the additional costs of automatic appeal but still
preserve the notion of judicial accuracy, small claims parties could petition the Appellate Body
to grant judicial review, similar to a writ of certiorari in U.S. law.193

2.

Rulings with no precedential effect

One justifiable concern with a small claims procedure would be abuse of the system.
Nordström and Shaffer consider the problem of a claim with little pecuniary value but potentially
large-scale systemic ramifications, as well as claims that could stoke political tensions. They
address this concern by suggesting that the DSU “state explicitly that an adopted panel decision
from a small claims procedure shall have no relevance for future cases and cannot be cited in any
subsequent small claims or other DSU proceeding.”194 Small claims decisions, thus, would not
create the “legitimate expectations” for parties, as do the regular decisions. 195 Correspondingly,
Nordström and Shaffer recommend that small claims procedures should only be available for
191
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cases where clear WTO precedent applies, preventing the use of small claims for novel WTO
concepts.196

3.

A permanent small claims body

A third consideration for a small claims procedure would be the creation of a permanent
body of panelists to adjudicate such claims. 197 The idea of a permanent body of panelists has also
been suggested for regular WTO disputes.198 Nordström and Shaffer posit that a permanent small
claims body may pave the way for a permanent WTO panel, which could then hear both types of
disputes.199 A permanent small claims body could decrease the WTO’s travel and
accommodation costs for panelists and also promote quality decisions by experienced panelists.
Practical concerns to keep in mind here are cost and availability of panelists. Even if it is
assumed that costs would decrease due to fewer international flights and hotels being booked for
panelists from around the world, one also must consider the price of paying permanent panelists
a full-time WTO salary. If a full-time salary is not going to be paid, then panelists may be less
available at any given time due to other career pursuits.

196

Id. at 29.
Id. at 39.
198
See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the European Communities and its Member States to the
improvement and clarification of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/38 (Jan. 23, 2003).
199
Nordström and Shaffer, supra note 176, at 39.
197

4.

Limit access to small claims procedure

Nordström and Shaffer consider the two alternatives of making a small claims procedure
available to all WTO Members as well limiting its use to “countries with smaller trade stakes.”200
As the goal of this paper is to enhance developing country access to the system, it argues for
limiting availability of small claims procedures to least-developed countries and developing
countries with smaller economies.
The rationale for limiting availability of such a procedure is that it would facilitate access
for countries that otherwise have not or cannot make use of the regular DSU procedures for the
reasons identified (among others) in Section II of this paper. 201 There are compelling arguments
against limiting the availability of a small claims procedure (it would build de jure inequality
into the system and would require arbitrary decisions as to which Members could use it, to name
a few).202 Yet the risk associated with availability to all Members (abuse of the system by
wealthy countries, primarily) is great, and could potentially topple the balance such a procedure
would seek to achieve. One potential alternative would be to make it available only if both
parties to a dispute consented, though this option could also be subject to abuse.
There is no doubt that a proposal for a small claims procedure would raise many
eyebrows among WTO Members. Moreover, this proposal suffers from pragmatic shortcomings.
First, Nordström and Shaffer are quick to point out that a small claims procedure, while fully
functioning in the national context, may simply be inapplicable to the WTO. 203 In a traditional
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small claims procedure, private individuals file claims, but in the WTO private persons have no
standing. Second, the authors explain that it would be politically difficult to restrict access to this
procedure when those being restricted are the most powerful WTO Members. 204 Nonetheless,
even if a full-blown small claims procedure is unworkable, the WTO could borrow some of its
more practical design schemes to improve the current process.

e.

The ACWL+

The Advisory Centre on WTO Law is a great success and provides a much needed
service to the WTO Members who would otherwise be disenfranchised by the system. 205 This
proposal in no way seeks to diminish the achievements of the Centre. It merely suggests ways to
enhance its capabilities and provide even better access to dispute settlement.

1.

Hire full-time economists on staff

As stated by the Director-General of the WTO, “[t]he opening of national markets to
international trade . . . will encourage and contribute to sustainable development, raise people's
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welfare, reduce poverty, and foster peace and stability.”206 With such goals in mind, one
concludes that it is not just access to dispute settlement for developing countries that is sought,
but smart usage of that system once access is granted.
The ACWL does a wonderful job of broadening the potential for developing country
access to WTO dispute settlement. To enhance this potential, in line with the development goals
mentioned above, the ACWL should hire full-time economic experts for its staff. These
economists would fulfill a development-oriented role for the ACWL, aiding developing countries
to make intelligent and strategic decisions about whether to bring claims to the WTO.
It is the job of the legal personnel at the ACWL to help developing countries analyze
their options, as they stem from legal rights and obligations, which the Centre does through
various functions.207 For example, the ACWL provides legal advice as to the chances of a client
prevailing in a dispute it has considered initiating at the WTO.208 A full-time economist, on the
other hand, could help developing countries analyze dispute settlement from the standpoint of
economic costs and benefits. An economist could help a developing country focus on economic
growth through trade policy, instead of just enforcement of rights.209
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2.

Create more ACWL-like establishments (and allow them to solicit cases)

There are two drawbacks to the ACWL: first, there is only one location and the demands
on it are many. Second, the ACWL’s mandate is limited. For reasons of impartiality and conflict,
it cannot initiate disputes.210 The ACWL can help a country that presents a potential claim to
decide whether to file a complaint, but it cannot research possible violations and then encourage
a developing country to pursue dispute settlement. For these reasons, this section first proposes
the creation of more ACWL-like institutions. It then suggests that any new legal aid
organizations allow for proactive solicitation of claims on behalf of developing countries if WTO
inconsistencies are apparent.
Since the WTO DSB is situated in Geneva, it made logical sense to establish the ACWL
in the same locale. Many developing countries, however, do not have legal or administrative
staffs placed in Geneva. Indeed, as mentioned above, some have no Geneva presence at all.211
This might make it difficult, then, for certain countries to access the resources provided by the
ACWL.
This proposal, however, is more than just a matter of alleviating geographical
inconvenience. Rather, it recognizes that Geneva does not have a monopoly on international
trade expertise. Washington, D.C., for example, is overflowing with international trade lawyers.
It makes geographical sense to expand a developing country’s legal aid options (the U.S. might
be an easier locale for Central American countries, for example), and it also makes sense to tap
into the resource of legal expertise that exists in Washington.212
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Other countries possess sophisticated (if not growing) legal expertise in international
trade as well. Brazil, for example, may be a logical center for South American legal aid. The
highly experienced countries of Australia and Japan may provide resources to countries situated
in the Far East and southeast. Given the success of the ACWL, an effort should be made to
expand the availability of such resources.
If there is funding to support the creation of additional ACWL-like organizations (which
is certainly an issue), the founders of such new initiatives should take the opportunity to alter the
blueprint. The ACWL’s mandate prevents the Centre from being able to raise potential issues
with developing countries and suggest that they take action. 213 In other words, “[t]he Advisory
Centre on WTO Law focuses only on the ‘downstream’ dimension of enforcement, not on the
‘upstream’ collection of information.”214 As discussed in Section I, developing countries struggle
with the collection and organization of information regarding potential foreign trade barriers and
the responsible parties (also known as “naming, blaming and claiming” 215). Additional legal aid
organizations should provide more than legal assistance. These entities should be created without
the same restrictions that apply to the ACWL, meaning they should be free to alert developing
countries to potential claims. They can then assist countries in deciding whether to take action
(which the ACWL already does if the country approaches them with a potential claim). 216 Other
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potential sources of legal aid include legal clinics sponsored by law schools and staffed by
students.217
To this end, the ACWL+ proposal as a whole should not be strictly limited to legal
services organizations. Rather, the proposal includes the notion that preexisting international
economic and development organizations (such as Oxfam, the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Center for
International Environmental Law, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Organization of
American States and the Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean) should
also be engaged in the pre-litigation fact-finding process, as well as in the information processing
stage.218
Some of the international organizations mentioned above already conduct this type of
analysis. 219 Typically, though, the information they gather is provided to governments. The idea
here is to promote more groups to participate in this process, and to encourage them not only to
provide information to governments but to the private sector in developing countries. Ultimately,
the goal would be for them to become a part of the public-private networks described above.
217
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3.

Encourage more broad-based support for ACWL

The third and final proposal under ACWL+ is to foster more broad-based support for the
organization itself, as well as for its Technical Expertise Fund. As with some of the other
proposals in this paper, a major stumbling block will continue to be locating a source of funding.
The problem, generally speaking, is that most potential donors decline to fund an organization
when doing so will likely increase the frequency of complaints against it. Nonetheless, support
and contributions from developed countries to the ACWL and the Technical Expertise Fund will
enhance the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system as a whole, as well as contribute
to the overall fairness of the system. 220 Perhaps any reform proposals to the WTO can include
stipulations for providing financial support to the ACWL and other similar centers.

f.

Continuum of Secretariat efforts

This final section proposes a continuum of efforts by the WTO Secretariat to facilitate
developing country access to dispute settlement.221 The aim is to identify a set of potential
Secretariat functions already existing within the WTO treaty terms that represent an increasing
level of assistance to developing countries. This proposal examines four sources of Secretariat
action. Three of the functions proposed here were covered to some extent in other proposals, and
therefore will not be discussed in detail except to explain where they fall on the continuum.
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1.

Article 27.2 (lowest level on the continuum)

As previously discussed, pursuant to DSU Article 27.2, the Secretariat may be required to
provide additional legal advice and assistance to developing countries during the dispute
settlement process.222 There is little guidance as to what form this assistance might take other
than that “the Secretariat shall make available a qualified legal expert from the WTO technical
cooperation services” if so requested by the developing country Member.223
The Article 27.2-level of assistance is quite stunted, primarily due to the passage of that
article which states: “[t]his [WTO technical cooperation] expert shall assist the developing
country Member in a manner ensuring the continued impartiality of the Secretariat.”224 The
language ensuring Secretariat neutrality guts any potential assistance that could be given because
it prevents an advocacy role in any form. As a result, Article 27.2 offers a weak level of
Secretariat engagement and a correspondingly weak level of assistance.

2.

Secretariat TPR reports as tools for developing countries (a step up on the continuum)

The TPRM has already been discussed in detail, and here it is suggested that the TPR
process could be used by developing countries as an adjunct to existing fact-finding avenues.
The Secretariat reports prepared for the TPR are extremely detailed, and, while these reports
could not be cited as evidence in disputes, they certainly help to point developing-country
complainants in the right direction. In other words, while it is not the official goal of the TPRM
to identify policies that potentially violate the WTO, it may be a useful starting point for finding
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other resources to prove such a violation. 225 TPR reports are already publicly accessible, so in
reality they can be used for any purpose. To the extent they are not already doing so, developing
countries should be analyzing them to protect against violations of their WTO rights.
WTO Members are likely to balk at this proposal, as is the Secretariat. The TPR
information is not supposed to be used for finding potential disputes, but if it gradually becomes
accepted to do so, the downside for developing countries is that it could just as easily be used
against them. In fact, developed countries have almost certainly already done this. One positive
for developing Members, however, is that the frequency of TPRs depends on a country’s share of
world trade. This means that the developed countries’ policies will be reviewed more frequently,
providing more opportunities to access the wealth of information provided therein.

3.

Regular use of the technical expertise provisions (another step up on the continuum)

It was already proposed above that the WTO provisions allowing for reliance upon
technical experts be utilized more frequently, if not made compulsory. In this context, the
Secretariat, through its role of assisting panels and pursuant to Article 27.2, could facilitate more
regular use of the various provisions allowing panels to turn to experts for technical advice. To
date, panels have rarely, if ever, appointed experts for cases other than those falling under the
SPS Agreement. From a developing country perspective, more frequent use of the provisions
allowing for the use of experts may help relieve some of the cost burden of hiring their own
experts to bring to WTO disputes.
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4.

Increased reliance on conciliation/mediation provisions in WTO agreements (highest
level on the continuum)
Finally, the Secretariat could engage in its highest level of involvement with developing

countries by encouraging more resolutions of disputes through the good offices, conciliation, and
mediation procedures of DSU Article 5. If more regular use of such procedures was made, it
would obviate the need for or at least ease the cost burden of preparing for a fully developed suit
at the DSB.
One area the Secretariat could look to for guidance on how to better facilitate these
procedures is the SPS Agreement, which encourages alternative and early approaches to
resolving potential disputes.226 Annex B to the SPS Agreement spells out a Member’s
“notification” obligations. In short, Members are required to “publish a notice of any proposed
SPS regulation, and to notify other Members, through the [SPS] secretariat . . . together with a
brief indication of its objective and rationale.”227 As Scott explains, “[n]otification is conceived
as an interactive rather than a one-way process,” and Members are required to provide
reasonable time for comment and discussion on those comments.228 Furthermore, Annex B
recommends that a Member provide notification while a regulation is still in its draft stage,
particularly so that amendments and comments can still be considered. 229
Ultimately, if a Member encounters significant difficulties with a proposed measure, the
Member is encouraged to “request an opportunity to discuss and resolve the potential difficulty
with the notifying member,” and it is expected that bilateral discussions will ensue. 230 By
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providing for bilateral engagement at such an early stage, the SPS secretariat is probably averting
disagreements that could eventually become full-blown disputes.
The WTO Secretariat should consider playing a similar role in promoting conciliation or
mediation, especially for developing countries. The goal, of course, would not be to undermine
the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system. The DSS is invaluable and in many ways
anchors the entire WTO system. Yet with rising litigation costs, particularly for developing
countries relative to their economies, it is worthwhile for the Secretariat to facilitate less costly
dispute resolution.

CONCLUSION

The problem of developing country access to WTO dispute settlement finds no simple
remedy. Perhaps this is because the problem itself is so multi-faceted, or perhaps because the de
facto inequality in the system caters to the will of the more powerful Members.
What remains clear is that however large the problems facing developing countries in the
WTO appear, the issues boil down rather simply. First, WTO litigation, particularly fact-finding,
is expensive. Developing countries struggle to finance trade initiatives when there are more
pressing issues within their borders. Second, WTO litigation is complex, requiring a
sophisticated level of legal capacity that, historically, developing countries have neither had nor
dedicated much time to developing. Finally, WTO litigation plays out in a rules-based forum, yet
the power politics of trade are omnipresent and influential on both the national and international
level.

Unequal access to justice threatens to delegitimize the WTO dispute settlement system,
the crown jewel of the world trade regime, as well as the WTO itself. Such inequality also
offends universal notions of fairness. To get the system back on track, all Members must commit
to seeking ways of granting developing countries more access to dispute settlement. Beyond the
access issue, WTO leadership needs to recognize the nuance that comes with smaller scale trade
operations, and address the differing interests of countries with smaller economies.
As this paper demonstrates, no one proposal provides a cure-all. The diverse proposals
should be parsed to select those pieces that are effective and discard those that are not. Efforts
must be broad-based but focused. Most importantly, developing country Members must take
responsibility for their internal trade programs and commit to dedicating the proper resources
toward trade policy development whenever possible.
The proposals set out in the previous section offer some useful starting points. Since cost
is always an issue, it is helpful to focus on aspects of each proposal that do not require additional
funding or encourage dispersed costs amongst the entire WTO Membership. Regarding the
creation of an institutionalized fact-finding body, the takeaway may be to characterize the
proposal in a way that shows the benefits to all WTO Members, not just developing countries. It
will be easier to gain broad-based support (especially financial support) if the proposal appeals to
the group’s collective sense of litigation burdens. It is also important to stress impartiality.
Collins’ suggestion to separate any fact-finding body from decision-making bodies remains
relevant going forward.
As to formalizing the discovery process, a good place to start is with more rigorous use of
the DSU and other provisions that already exist. Panels have recourse to numerous provisions on

experts under the covered agreements, and should make every effort to rely on those provisions
if a cost-benefit analysis suggests expert contributions would help resolve the dispute.
With respect to formal and informal public-private partnerships, developing countries
may have trouble creating a formal legislative mechanism for private petition. Informally,
however, private entities have many options. Apart from any official action on the part of the
government, commercial interests should organize into trade associations geared toward efficient
information exchange. The trade associations should hold symposiums and invite knowledgeable
speakers to inform them on how the WTO affects their interests. The collective resources of the
industry could fund such gatherings, thereby dispersing costs. If trade association support is
widespread, such groups can exert significant pressure on government officials to take action on
trade issues. Another way to avoid extra costs is to utilize the publicly available information in
TPR reports. Once firms are better informed of their rights, they should use this information to
persuade the government to act.
A small claims procedure may require a few start-up costs, but overall costs should go
down once the appropriate claims can be settled through this expedited mechanism. One costfree step toward a small claims procedure is to begin limiting page numbers of party submissions
and require shorter decisions from the WTO adjudicative bodies even in the regular process.
Also, panels and the Appellate Body could start an informal categorization and tracking system
to flag cases that a) could be considered appropriate for a small claims proceeding and b) would
represent settled precedent, which would lend itself to small claims procedures.
It is more difficult to find cost-free approaches to the ACWL+ proposal. By nature, that
proposal requires funding, not just to increase and diversify the staff of the ACWL, but also to
sponsor additional centers with the same goals and encourage broad-based support for the idea of

WTO legal aid. One feasible step toward achieving this goal would be to increase public
awareness of the services offered by the ACWL, the hope being to engage private sector
resources for funding. Currently the WTO homepage contains no visible link to the ACWL’s
Web site or to any easily accessible information on the Centre’s mission. It would be inexpensive
to include such a link with key information on the WTO site.
Finally, the idea behind a continuum of Secretariat efforts is already geared toward an
incremental approach. By giving more teeth to DSU Article 27.2, one would take an initial step
that would include a duty on the part of developing countries to invoke the services offered under
the covered agreements. Since all of the continuum’s steps come from Secretariat functions
already existing in the WTO literature, no additional implementation costs should be incurred
except for the price of hiring experts.
These preliminary steps are the pieces from each of the above proposals that are the most
workable and the most cost-effective. They may eventually lead to full implementation of the
recommendations, but for now they offer a feasible starting point.
Unless developing country access to dispute resolution improves, the WTO system will
continue neglecting those that it promised, at its inception, to try to protect. If international trade
is indeed a tool of sustainable development, increased welfare, and poverty reduction, then the
WTO and its dispute settlement system need to help realize those goals for every single Member.

